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Dramatic and rapid reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are needed to 
stay within 2°C scenarios. How can the radical, global transformations in the 
systems that shape the production and consumption of energy be achieved?  
 
Given the size of its emissions and economy, China is central to achieving this 
transformation. Its UN climate commitment has set ambitious targets for cutting carbon 
emissions. Innovation is crucial to achieving these targets, but this innovation must take 
place in and transform specific domains of society and everyday life. What could these 
futures look like – socially and qualitatively? 
 
This document presents a set of four scenarios regarding possible futures of 
urban e-mobility in China.   
 
It has been developed on the basis of evidence collected in the urban e-mobilities work 
package of the ESRC-funded project ‘Low Carbon Innovation in China: Prospects, Politics 
and Practices’,1 a collaboration between researchers at the Centre for Mobilities Research 
(CeMoRe), Lancaster University and the Graduate School at Shenzhen, Tsinghua University. 
 
As the title suggest, this project has examined contemporary low-carbon innovations, 
including in e-mobility, focusing on the specific issues of the parallel evolution of those 
innovations with a changing landscape of social power relations and (possibly everyday) 
social practices.  This approach builds on conceptions of low-carbon transition as a matter of 
the transformation of entire socio-technical systems: where both the irreducible importance 
of social (never just technological) factors and their integration into complex, multi-factorial 
systems merit emphasis.   
 
This perspective conditions a particular interest in forms and aspects of innovation beyond 
high-technology development along what are currently understood to be ‘obvious’ routes – 
though it also incorporates these innovations.  But to understand the prospects of 
widespread adoption and development of these less high-profile and high-technology 
innovations, the importance of two further factors becomes clear.   
 
First, the uptake and shape of innovations are conditioned by, and in turn condition, the 
differential enabling and disabling in society of particular agents, institutions and projects. 
For instance, the contemporary dominance of the system of social relations built up around 
the production and use of the steel-and-petroleum (internal combustion engine, ICE) car 
profoundly shapes the prospects of other competing mobility innovations.  
 
Secondly, demand for specific forms of mobility is similarly shaped by the everyday practices 
of those who produce and use them, and how these fit (or not) into their daily lives.  For 
instance, demand for a conventional car may be based on the need to travel long distances 
on highways for a daily commute or the need to transport children or shopping on the way.  
 
As such, even if our interest is just the seemingly techno-economic issue of which mobility 
technologies will flourish and which will wither in the medium-term, this can only be 
meaningfully addressed by situating such innovation in this broader context.  But, of course, 
doing so also immediately opens up questions about winners and losers in these social 
futures, how we normatively respond to these prospects and what, if anything, can be 
intentionally done to shape them.  
 
Since late 2013 this project has thus examined these two issues of changing social power 
relations and everyday mobility practices and their parallel change as regards the adoption 




two-wheelers (E2Ws) in four significant but different locations – Beijing, Shenzhen, Shanghai 
and Shandong province – where this comparative lens offers a practicable window into these 
complex, multi-factorial and fast-evolving systems.   
 
We have adopted a qualitative approach in this research, including over 40 in-depth 
interviews with producers, entrepreneurs, government, NGOs, academics and users, 7 focus 
groups with diverse users of e-mobility users, and qualitative observations of e-mobility on 
site over a total of nearly 3 months of fieldwork between 2013 and 2016.  For more 




Building scenarios of future Chinese e-mobility 
 
This project thus takes a deliberately broad and systemic perspective, built on attention to 
the intrinsic openness and uncertainty of the emergence and transition at system level. This 
analysis, however, cannot lead to definitive and singular conclusions about the prospects of 
such low-carbon innovation.  Instead, it enables the construction of a set of scenarios.  
These scenarios are not to be understood nor used as supposedly objective extrapolations 
of current trends, with measurable probabilities attached to each one.  Inverting familiar 
expectations about the outputs of a rigorous scientific approach, any such confident singular 
prediction directly goes against the intrinsic and irreducible complexity and, hence, 
unknowability of the evolution at systems level to which the research precisely wants to draw 
attention.  
 
So the scenarios are not predictions, but neither are they simply fictional speculations.  
Instead, they are constructed as sets of plausible future systems,2 with each such scenario 
qualitatively possible, in terms of the possible co-emergence and interaction amongst the 
multiple elements that constitute them.  And they are to be used primarily as devices to 
stimulate thought in the multiple parties and stakeholders that will inevitably shape what 
does in fact come to be the case; perhaps alerting these readers to issues (or relations 
between issues) they had not previously considered or eliciting a change in perspective 
regarding the issue in question.   
 
They have been constructed in the first instance through an iterative process of internal peer 
review, drawing on the empirical evidence from our research regarding key and/or 
embryonic trends in e-mobility innovation today in China.  These have been combined with 
consideration of major considerations across the multiple relevant scales (global, national, 
local) and institutional levels (state, business, civic and consumer) relevant to low-carbon 
system transition, as well ‘mega-trends’ also relevant to this question.  
 
For instance, the latter includes issues such as: energy resources (e.g. peak oil) and energy 
transition; geopolitical concerns including a ‘global war on terror’; the unknown effect of 
climate change and breaching other planetary boundaries; futures of employment and 
production of goods, value and knowledge; unforeseeable technological breakthroughs; and 
the trajectories of globalization and intra- and inter-national inequalities.  
 
The scenarios were then discussed in depth at a workshop in Shenzhen (in March 2016)3 
involving over 40 key stakeholders, including entrepreneurs, representatives of major e-
mobility and auto sector corporations, government, academia, NGOs (local and international) 
and students.  This generated feedback that has since been incorporated into the scenarios 
that we present here.  We repeat, however, that the goal of this document is to stimulate 





Key Findings: Embryonic Trends in Contemporary Urban Mobility in China 
 
In general, we find a highly dynamic landscape of e-mobility innovation, characterized by 
ongoing deepening of conventional, ICE car-based mobility (and its problems) with a diverse 
set of mobility innovation niches, all of which are at present what innovation scholars have 
called ‘hopeful monstrosities’.4  In this situation, it is particularly unclear what a future urban 
e-mobility system will look like, since how these niches develop both individually and in 
combination, and towards growth and transition or stagnation and disappearance, cannot be 
reliably plotted.  
 
Nonetheless, assisting projection of plausible 
futures, our research finds the following 
specific major emerging social trends 
regarding urban (e-)mobility futures in 
China, none of which are obvious through a 
lens that focuses on the simple technological 
replacement of the ICE car by the electric car.  
In each case, the item connotes a question 
regarding the unknown way in which that 
issue will develop, given that it is clearly 
currently in play and potentially significant for 
mobility system transition: 
 
• Significant continuing challenges – social and regulatory, not just technological – for 
the rapid adoption of the plug-in EV as replacement of the ‘car’ 
• The increasing importance of information communication technologies, internet 
connectivity, social media and data in mobility, including as a key consumer demand  
• A possible generational shift, particularly in big cities, from intense socio-cultural 
aspiration and status competition regarding personal ownership of a big (foreign) car 
to greater interest in shared mobility and online connectivity that remains status-
conscious 
• Continuing growth in awareness (particularly regarding health) about environmental 
issues (e.g. air quality) together with ongoing emergence (or at least resilience) of a 
‘green public sphere’ online and environmental action/activism 
• Quantitative growth of small and/or ‘disu’ (low-speed) EVs, together with qualitative 
dynamism in changing social status associated with these vehicles and E2Ws  
• The importance of the parallel emergence and shaping of the (urban) ‘middle 
class(es)’ and their growing and changing demands for ‘liveability’ alongside 
persistent priorities of autonomy and private space 
• Fluidity and a recent burst in dynamism in the levels and mechanisms of support for 
e-mobility, including new forms of corporate competition and changing priorities and 
initiatives for government support  
• Ecological civilization, ‘new normal’ and the new Urbanization Plan (and, indeed, the 
‘Belt/Road’ policy of external investment in a new Silk Road by land and sea) as top-
level government projects signalling progressive shifts towards major green 
investment.  
 
Together, then, these findings both draw on and illuminate how e-mobility transition and 




inseparable. The former are thus a window onto the latter, which then in turn illuminate the 
former again:  our specific focus here.  
 
In particular, this process highlights as two key dimensions 
regarding future trajectories for e-mobility in China the 
questions of whether and how there will be convergence or 
divergence regarding: 
 
• First, these diverse system niches of EVs, disu, 
E2W, public, car/ride-sharing, digital and self-
propelled (conventional bicycles and walking) 
mobility; and 
• Secondly, the diverse models of urban mobility and 
mobility (innovation) governance that currently exist 
around the country – an enormous country, lest we 
forget, with significant geographical, climatic, 
sociocultural, economic/industrial and local 
governmental diversity. 
 
The four scenarios, thus, highlight different futures regarding these two key dynamics given 






Four plausible scenarios of future urban e-mobilities in China 
 
We take 2041 (25 years from now) as our date, between commonly used dates of 2030 and 
2050 for much current forecasting work.  A quarter of a century is also roughly half the 
period identified by Vaclav Smil as the necessary time historically for a transition in energy 
system through deployment of new innovations.5  Hence, currently emergent trends will be 
significantly entrenched by then, but new and unforeseeable breakthroughs and 
developments will not yet have had time to have systemic impact.   
 
As such, these futures may seem decidedly unfuturistic, in technological terms, to some 
readers.  Yet this is a deliberate decision of this analysis. For, recalling the primary aim of 
these scenarios, the priority here is to highlight the dramatically different social futures that 
are currently plausible system-level outcomes of the mass adoption of innovations already in 
evidence (however embryonic); and, hence, the political and strategic choices that are both 
available and inescapable.    
 
Four scenarios are developed below, in no particular order of probability, or eve plausibility. 
Nor are they presented in any order of normative preference with none to be taken as ‘ideal’, 
either involving the definitive resolution of all contemporary challenges or without costs and 
trade-offs.  They are:  
 
S1: Slow people-centric e-mobility  
S2: Hi-tech elite e-mobility 
S3: ‘BAU’ (business as usual) digitized mobility 
S4: Secure, splintered e-mobility 
These may, in turn, be summarized in terms of four sociological ‘archetypes’, capturing what 
is most socially praised and aspired to in each scenario – what superlatives are strived for 
and are sources of socially-enabling status competition – with implications for the systems 
and practices of urban mobility in each case: 
 
S1: 21st century sage – the most ‘balanced’, ‘poised’  
S2: Fast-living high-mobility innovator – the most elite, fastest, richest 
S3: Influential celebrity – the most and best connected, the most ‘friends’/ followers 
S4: Responsible custodian – the most vigilant or prudent and loyal to their city 
To get a more comprehensive sense of these four scenarios, however, we must explore in 
some detail the coevolution of multiple dimensions in their meso-level concrete detail.  
Specifically, in each scenario we explore possible parallel changes of 7 key system elements: 
 
1.  (Daily) mobility patterns and demand 
2.  Vehicle forms and their use 
3. Industries, innovations and employment 
4. Infrastructures and energy & resource systems 
5. Regulations and governance (at multiple relevant scales) 
6. Aspirations, values and status competition 
7. Environmental impacts 
 
The scenarios should thus be read ‘in the round’ as thought experiments regarding a new 
‘system logic’ that may emerge from the messy and contingent combination of tendencies 


















S1: Slow people-centric mobility 
Life is slower.   
There has been a sizeable and deliberate deceleration of life: first chosen by many, 
led by the urban knowledge-working middle classes, seeking a post-materialist and 
green ‘liveability’ focused on maximizing time; then progressively regulated as such.   
But this is still within a capitalist market society that actually both circumscribes this 
new ‘slowness’ for many and prescribes familiar ‘speed’ for many more.  
Hence, there is slower and reduced mobility, shifting to localization (and changing 
urban forms), more leisure and (online-mediated) civic activity but also highly 
environmentally- and socially-conscious mutual policing and snobbery.  
 




Mobility is slower, smoother, less hurried and simply less 
 
- China has passed ‘peak stuff’ and has moved to become globally leading in this regard, and wages are lower (especially for elite white collar 
workers) but more equal, if still far from evenly distributed. 
- Mobility is part of the day during which you can do what you were doing anyway, hence speed from A to B is not a priority. 
- Rush hours (and range anxiety) are a thing of the past, since there is no need to be in the office or leave at a certain time. 
- Distances travelled have diverged into shorter (given relocation of life and work, including increasing home-based working) and longer (given 
reliable, high-speed inter-city linkages for business trips across the country), with green gentrification of old city centres. 
- As China’s population has ‘grown old’, the growth of demand for slow, smoother, safer and healthier mobility has also been significant, including 
from younger generations who are keen to keep elderly parents (-in-law) mobile so that their autonomy in turn is maximized. 
Vehicle forms and 
use 
A shift to diverse ecologies of small electric vehicles and transit-oriented development 
 
- EVs and disu have converged on small EV–based and transit-oriented development (ToD) systems (including walking and conventional bicycles for 
well-being), with multiple locally-relevant models of urban mobility around the country (and world). 
- ‘Cars’ have become increasingly unacceptable as ‘big’, ‘decadent’, ‘selfish’, ‘backward’ (and ‘American’) vehicles.  
- No personal ownership of vehicles, even bikes, is increasingly normal and unexceptional. 
- Integrated public/ quasi-private sharing multi-modal systems involving multiple vehicle forms. 




Chinese mobility innovation, including social innovation, leads the world 
 
- Chinese global leadership in both disu/connected vehicle systems and E2Ws via global innovation networks, locally adapted around the world. 
- Significant social innovation and voluntary civic activity, including in mobility and practices affecting demand for mobility and energy, creates 




- New construction, maintenance and innovation jobs, albeit in a clearly two-tiered labour market: ‘highly’-skilled knowledge work driving innovation of 
the new system including new infrastructures; and ‘lower’-skilled work from job-creating and capital–substituting ‘disruptive’ (high labour, low capital) 
innovation, which creates new markets of newly affordable, high-quality services, and from the construction of those new infrastructures… 
Infrastructures and 
energy and resource 
systems 
Significant new infrastructures effecting a major decarbonization 
 
- … e.g. under-road, solar-powered inductive charging on expressways and city redesign towards more human-centric, liveable models, with many 
roads reclaimed for green spaces and old city centres developed into dense but green cities. 
- Growing (global) public investment in innovation leads to a parallel decarbonisation, incremental but significant cheapening of batteries and 
breakthroughs in batteries and battery recycling (towards water and salt as main ingredients), relieving pressure on Li resource competition. 
Regulations and 
(local) governance 
Cars and acceleration of life are strictly limited 
 
- ‘No car’ bans across all Chinese cities of over 100,000 inhabitants. Local and national public education campaigns and regulations penalize car 
ownership and parking, shifting attitudes and status competition starkly from cars to other modes and outlets, including display of green 
consumerism. 
- Speed limits of 20 mph across all cities with ubiquitous connectivity, but also clearly-marked ‘off’ buttons. 
- Deliberate knowledge-middle-class-led state control over accelerating mobilities, focused on trade-off of less accumulation and financial wealth for 
more time, interpersonal connection and broader distribution of system benefits.  
- Working hours (micro-measured by hours on work computer systems) are strictly limited to 40 per week with penalties, not overtime, for working 
longer (on any one job – a source of much snobbery and hypocrisy) and are self-policed via social media. 
- Diverse, local systems of mobility, governed by local government specialized to different characteristics and forms of Chinese cities, including 




The modern Chinese sage 
 
- Status is a matter of competition and pride in local and/or cosmopolitized connectivity, leisure time and use of the latest, smallest or lightest 
‘ecological footprint’ and greenest technologies in the most ‘balanced’ (and ‘Chinese’, defined as ‘21st century-cum-ancient’) way of life. 
Environment Deep decarbonisation and local environmental sustainability measures 
 
- Combination of deliberate slowing of mobility, innovation investment and switch to e-mobility/ToD leads to a trajectory of clear and sizeable 







S2: Hi-tech elite mobility 
Life is lived ‘on the move’ and has continued to accelerate … and to diverge.  
E-mobility has emerged as a key industry and innovation, at the heart of a 
transformation of social life, and with China in the lead.  
But it has also deepened social inequalities, with growing separation of the 
mobility rich and the mobility poor. 




Always on the move 
- People are always at work and expected to be mobile (even when sleeping, if necessary); personal service has become a norm for those who can 
afford it, to take care of the home. 
- Deepening divergence into a mobility rich (knowledge-working, green ‘middle class’) and mobility poor, with divisions increasingly cemented and 
little social mobility between ‘green’ and ‘black’ classes.  
- Middle classes live in new eco-cities and greened high-class housing compounds and travel at maximized speeds to wherever is needed, 
especially attractive, gigantic and greened CBDs. ‘Black’ classes live at lower elevations, in denser and poorer housing with worse environments. 
- Access to upper tiers of mobility services depend on both ability to pay and invitation to elite ‘mobility clubs’, self-policed through social media 
ratings (e.g. ‘likes’). 
- Mobility poor are dependent on increasingly localized and isolated life/work (within both cities and in rural spaces) and evermore crowded and 
underfunded public transport or the lowest, cattle-class tiers of the ‘big 3’ mobility services. 
Vehicle forms Elite EV systems… with a highly proscribed but still massive E2W niche 
- There has been divergence of EV and E2W/disu towards elite, high-tech, smart, private, proprietary and steeply-tiered  EV mobility services 
(including semi-private small buses) amidst lives of accelerating, individualized pressure and increasing regulatory barriers to E2W/disu. 
- Adoption of EVs takes off as charging and parking problems dissipate amidst dominant models of use built on car-sharing, not personal ownership, 
and elements of autonomous driving.  
- ‘Chinese Tesla’ (Faraday Future), Tesla and Apple – that latter two both now in coalition with Chinese partners – as dominant oligopoly. 
- E2Ws/disu are increasingly cemented as ‘low quality’ (di suzhi) and/or ‘rural’ vehicles and banned from many roads in big cities, but remain 




Global corporate knowledge-economy concentration, centred in China 
- Telecoms, grid and ‘BAT’ giants have progressively merged into an oligopoly of 3 mega-systems, each offering increasingly steeply-tiered mobility 
services, with little personal ownership of ‘cars’ 
- Chinese EV and e-mobility brands ascendant, with significant praise and support from government. The Chinese innovation system more broadly 
takes the shape of an enormous (in absolute terms) iceberg, mostly below the ‘surface’ level of global competitiveness but with a singularly steep 
and high peak above the surface.  Hence there are several unquestionably global-leading brands that afford growing global connotations of ‘Chinese’ 
as ‘top quality technology’, but with this disguising –even as it is built upon – the overwhelmingly larger system ‘below’ the surface.  




megacity regions of Silicon Delta (硅三角，guisanjiao), Silicon Capital (硅京，guijing) and Silicon River (硅江，guijiang) as major global players. 
- Deepening dynamics of technological un(der)employment, including in knowledge white-collar professions, creates mass reserve of labour and 
hence counter-dynamics of innovations that draw on cheap ‘unskillled’ and ‘semi-skillled’ (if, in fact, possibly highly educated) workers, including in 
services (in the home, care etc..), document work and private security, amidst fears of a growing unemployable ‘rabble’.  
- Concentration squeezes out other innovation and funding for it, including increasing philanthropic and scholarship support for a commercialized 
higher education system that elicits intense global educational competition for access to top 10 universities (3 in China, 3 in US, 2 in EU, 1 in India, 1 
in Singapore) that also entrenches privilege between generations, and real estate competition for the ‘best’ school places (leading to the best 
universities, and then the best “knowledge jobs” in a shrunken and steeper job market). 
Infrastructures and 
energy and resource 
systems 
Unlimited growth of high-speed, high-tech, smart mobility infrastructures 
- Continued growth of gaosu (high-speed) road network, including underground and elevated urban expressways, and with increasing regulation that 
only (comparatively expensive) autonomous/connected vehicles may use them: a ‘super’-motorway (zhaogao) on which cars are both the only form 
of traffic and the only drivers. 
- Disruption of mobility on the zhaogao is seriously disruptive (potentially stranding millions in a single incident) and hence subject to intense security 
measures.   
- Autonomous driving (AD), with a human back-up driver, is permitted only on designated main roads.   AD without any passengers is only permitted 
for licensed cars and when going directly from one passenger to an identified next one within 500 metres, all monitored remotely by the police.  
- All mobility (including walking, via smartphones) is tracked and big data monitored (as are smart houses/Internet of Things) to maximize system 
efficiency and further ‘innovation’, but by multiple competing mega-corporate systems, not unified state oversight.  
- Coal plants are moved further and further away from big cities and there is slow installation of CCS (carbon capture and sequestration), while there 
is a clean energy transition in cities to (thin film) solar PV, starting with those who can afford it. 
Regulations and 
(local) governance 
Green but socially regressive regulation 
- Green taxes and personal carbon budgets serve primarily to benefit the wealthy as green technologies are expensive, acting as de facto regressive 
tax cuts; hence greening is a step up in quality of life for richer ‘middle class’ sections of society, but a step down for poorer sections who are instead 
decarbonized through abandoning advantages of fossil-fueled mobile lives. 
- E2Ws/disu are now strictly policed, including with automatic immobilizers through Bluetooth chips on many main roads or by full movement tracking 
and remote surveillance and criminal prosecution. E2Ws thus become de facto the choice of the poor and the criminal. 
- Convergence on single megacity model as dominant, with 2nd, 3rd, 4th… tier Chinese cities officially aspiring to follow suit and attract top ‘global 




The fast-living high-mobility innovator  
– Competition is intense and aims to be the most elite, fastest, richest, smartest and most (globally) mobile. 
Environment Environmental improvements, but erratic and unequally distributed 







S3: BAU digitized mobility 
Life has become increasingly inter-connected but dependent on small-time 
‘entrepreneurialism’ (chuangye) for day-to-day survival in a broader social and 
environmental climate of unease.   
And e-mobility has never successfully emerged, plagued by problems at every step.   
Instead there remains a ‘business as usual’ (BAU) mobility system of (a lot more!) 
largely private ICE cars… and so gridlock.   
But cars have become smart homes, incorporating a lot more interconnectivity and 
digitization: the focus of socio-technical change more generally. 
 




Highly individualized lives, competing for networked opportunities 
- Intensely competitive lives are dependent on high connectivity, managing vast networks of fleeting contacts and individual work projects, but via 
digital not physical co-presence. 
- Hence an increasing shift from physical to digital mobility – and deepening problems of obesity generating intense health concern more generally. 
- Housing is progressively greened, if slowly and unevenly, based on slow roll-out and personal purchase of expensive hi-tech innovations while the 
shift to ‘smart homes’ often increase energy demand in ‘rebound’ effects. 
- Cities remain zoned, leading to long commutes for most of those who have ‘regular’ employment. 
- Private car ownership remains dominant, with sharing tried but rejected on a grand scale as it proves unreliable when most needed: as the 
spectacular immobility (da geqian) of Spring Festival 2024 proves to many, when across Chinese mega-cities, the tiny number of available cars 
leaves hundreds of thousands unable to catch flights or high-speed trains on time, and so stranded. 
- Instead car-sharing simply replaces taxis and undermines public transport, leading to greater demand for private cars. 
- Digitization/ informationalization/ automated driving (in the limited form of negotiating slow-moving traffic on highways and automated parking) 
means congestion becomes considered less of a problem as one can still be productive and even 2+ hour ‘carmageddon’ commutes are adapted to. 
Vehicle forms Hybrid cars trump plug-in battery EVs 
- The plug-in electric car proves more problematic with each step forward: 
- high-profile risk events and daily encounters of EV failure (ring-road breakdowns, from which rescue can take many  hours) & frustration 
- battery and charging explosions and fires, and persistent fears about ‘radiation’ 
- persistent issues of battery breakdown  
- rapid depreciation of batteries and financial risk in purchase 
- Meanwhile ICE hybrid improvements and new ‘clean’/’green’ sources of liquid hydrocarbon fuels lead to persistently low oil/gas prices and 
increasingly competitive life-cycle GHG emissions profiles vs. EVs, without all the frustration of the new and never-maturing technological system. 
- Cars become increasingly adapted for ‘living in’, not just travelling, and personalized – a highly personal and jealously protected space. And indeed 
an increasing number of people are de facto living in their cars since, with personal carbon budgets, houses are too expensive to maintain.  







Innovation is concentrated in digitized information systems, not in mobility systems 
- No global EV technological breakthroughs (e.g. battery) emerge due to systemic innovation under-investment and continued proprietary 
US/German/Japanese tech leadership and consumer preferences in China. Many successful Chinese firms offer cheaper and high-quality versions, 
but never take the technological or innovation lead, while local protectionism prevents consolidation of these Chinese firms. 
- Instead there is convergence in the market on cut-throat and low-margin (hence low innovation) competition amongst a small number of JVs of 
Chinese and foreign companies offering a range of vehicles (rather than mobility services) on micro-hire purchase schemes.  
- The informationalization of life generally, including of mobility, is instead the priority of innovation; and benefits the hybrid more than the pure EV. 
- Hence technological unemployment is mitigated by both new instalment and services of ‘smart’ living for urban middle-classes. But also, 
inseparably, by ICT-enabled growth of the ‘gig economy’ and micro-hiring platforms for all personal assets, dividing classes amongst: the wealthy 
and secure; the middling, modestly asseted and ‘wheeling and dealing’; and the unskilled, unasseted and heavily policed.  
Infrastructures and 
energy and resource 
systems 
Infrastructures for smart interconnectivity… and cars, not EVs 
- Tesla’s building of gigafactory elicits spike in Li demand and price, starting years of resource competition, conflict, smuggling and controversy. 
- Adequate charging infrastructures are never built given expense, disruption, persistent objections of landlords and property management (wuye) 
(vs. stuttering EV demand), irresolvable diversity of standards etc… 
- But smart energy infrastructures are increasingly built, and personal energy use is increasingly regulated by smart meters. 
- Conventional roads and city sprawl grows, but with digital infrastructures increasingly embedded, while new infrastructures for ‘green hydrocarbons’ 
are also rolled out, locking in new dependence. 
Regulations and 
(local) governance 
Personal carbon budgets, monitored at every step 
- Individualized carbon budgets condition further individualized opting for digital over physical mobility wherever possible. 
- E2Ws and disu are increasingly regulated to stasis: E2Ws peak and even fall, leaving only small-distance logistics as users (admittedly a booming 
sector), as individuals either shift up to hybrid cars or back down to bicycles/public transport to avoid financial penalties of their ownership and use. 
- Unified government databases monitor personal carbon budgets, which can be (micro-)traded; individualized mobility tracking affords monitoring of 
mobility carbon budgets too; and e.g. stop/start hybrid engines allow minimization of GHG emissions even in congestion (and no worse than EVs), 




The influential entrepreneur celebrity 
- With connections so important for life opportunities amidst intense competition, individualized financial security is achieved through being the most 
and best connected, with the most ‘friends’/ followers. 
Environment Rebound effects, slow environmental improvements and worsening environmental risks 
- EV emissions prove worse, specifically for health as PM2.5 (and then PM1.5, which emerges as even more important to health, affecting 
metabolism), than ICE/hybrid. 
- Rebound effects of deepening digitization and more cars with slow low-carbon innovation mean air quality and GHG emissions fall only slowly, 






S4: Secure, splintered e-mobility 
This scenario emerges through a one-off or deepening shock 
(perhaps geopolitical, perhaps digitized) that effects a 
‘sobering’, hunkering down and diminution of personal 
expectations of improving livelihoods.  
In the aftermath, people are highly security conscious and 
privilege forms of organization and socio-technical innovations 
that enable relatively small-scale, person-to-person trust-based 
systems alongside megacity-based systems of state protection.  
Hence there is a turn away from both accelerating and ever-deeper global interconnectivity and fossil fuels, and to technologies (of mobility) 
that afford personal control, maintenance and tinkering in ways that are also sensitive to local networked inter-dependence and system security. 
 




Personal responsibility for local (i.e. metropolitan) system resilience 
- Life is reshaped by privileging local system resilience and integrity in forms of primarily localized, city-based trust in the context of global security 
fears: environmental and socio-technical. 
- Cities and regions are increasingly differentiated into regionally significant and secure megacities (now around 60% of China’s population, the vast 
majority of whom are now urban residents for at least two generations with no remaining laoxiang connections) and the rest. 
- There are in/out formal classifications of residents of an urban ‘burgher’ class, as evolution of the hukou system, who are expected to take strong 
personal responsibility for metropolitan security, as ‘networked-individuality’, while those without this status are formally excluded and policed. 
- Hence a splintering divergence of worlds into higher-tech urban vs. rural or (what are now called at international level) ‘non-developing countries’, 
with small e-cars and E2Ws respectively as dominant vehicles. 
- The shift to ‘networked-individuality’ amongst this urban burgher class includes shared mobility ‘clubs’, but where this is built on highly security-
conscious and individually and privately owned (not corporate or government) networks and local private-public partnership (PPP) entrepreneurialism 
not globally concentrated sharing platforms. 
- Home/work/leisure are increasingly relocated within smaller distances into ‘new villages’ (xincun), reducing commutes and overall mobility, even as 
mobility and autonomy within city limits (and to/from city centres) is carefully and robustly defended and preserved.  
- Private or quasi-private transport preferred, but owning and running vehicles is expensive. 
Vehicle forms Shift from cars to EV-disu small electric cars… and bikes 
- Cars are widely rejected, as both expensive to own and fossil-fuelled (i.e. both not ‘green’ and dependent on insecure global systems of provision). 
- Instead EV-disu small electric cars come to dominate, as also expensive, but increasingly affordable, and run on reliable local electricity. 
- E2Ws increasingly diverge into two types: expensive, trackable and allowed vs. cheap and banned and/or exported. 
- Autonomous driving is rejected as too dangerous following the ‘mass hack’ terrorist attack of cars in Los Angeles, 2028 and countless car bombs. 







Global-local champions of security innovation 
- The electric car is a market and industry that emerges through merger of Chinese disu private brands with global auto majors (largely familiar from 
early 21st C) and a handful of Chinese auto majors, creating multi-located networked ‘local champions’ that then dominate their local markets (e.g. 
Pearl River Delta-Osaka-Ruhr-Texas-São Paulo vs. Shanghai-Seoul-Southern California-Mumbai-Northern England…). 
- IP (and profits) are owned by these auto majors, hence not concentrated in China, but with China a crucial market and node in new e-car system. 
- Globalization undergoes a ‘phase shift’ from accelerating fluid mobility in all directions to ‘lumpy’ mobility amongst distinct (‘neo-Hansa’) networks of 
global cities, while rural peripheries become increasingly remote.  Essential inter-city trade becomes increasingly the preserve of non-urban classes 
as adventurers and risk-taking merchants (e.g. on the new Silk Roads through unstable regions) amidst diminishing other opportunities for them.  
- Digitization continues but making extensive use of intra-nets and deliberately limited connectivity, firewalls etc… into smaller, more stable and 
limited-access digital networks, with local government permission needed to contact to the global internet. 
- Growth in employment emerges in reshaping city regions for greater system resilience and security, including local factories and (urban/ urban-
peripheral) farms. 
- Cheap, lower-tech E2Ws remain resilient only as an export business to the ‘non-developing’ countries and rural areas. 
Infrastructures and 
energy and resource 
systems 
New local public-private infrastructures of distributed provision and surveillance 
- Personal and public charging infrastructures increasingly but unevenly built by local governments in PPPs with local enterprises and philanthropists.  
- Local government- and civic-sponsored shifts to distributed renewable energy grids – but not highly interconnected or ‘smart’ ones everywhere.  
- Distributed system infrastructures for networked-individual P2P mutual policing and surveillance: you are ‘on grid’ in the metropolitan region. 
- Intense competition for key resources outside city regions, especially in regions that become increasingly constrained to primary sectors and are 
owned by megacity-based corporations and institutions, deepens geographical disparities of urban and rural, developed and not, ‘safe’ and not.  
Regulations and 
(local) governance 
Strict regulation by devolved city governments 
- Increasing devolution of (mobility) governance, including innovation and security, to metropolitan regions within strong national security policies. 
- Increasing local penalties for pollution and national regulations for system autonomy from global energy markets add to the (‘burgher’) shift to 
electric vehicles from ICE cars, but at different rates and to different models in different city regions. 
- Congestion is also strictly regulated at city level, to allow for rapid disaster response, and only local vehicles are allowed on major roads. 
- Charging infrastructures, especially private ones, require guards to secure access against extortion from petty criminals and aggrieved and 
excluded non-city-registered residents blocking them. 




The responsible custodian of the complex urban system 
- The priority for the Chinese (and global) burgher (‘middle’) classes, with their lower expectations, is city-based security, with dangers ‘outside’. 
- Emphasis is placed on vigilant and responsible personal action, particularly vis-à-vis local others with whom you are interdependent, including 
whom one interacts with (online) and/or whom one invites into mobility clubs, with a view to local complex system resilience.  
Environment Accelerating but highly urban-localized environmental improvements 
- Air quality and GHG emissions have improved slowly, then dramatically with the ‘shock’, followed by incremental-but-accumulating-and-






These four scenarios are radically different, not only in terms of how and why urban mobility 
takes place but also regarding the broader socio-political character of Chinese (and, likely, 
global) society with which mobility systems co-evolve.  There remains a high degree of 
diversity and variation in the plausible futures for Chinese e-mobility.  We summarize these 
differences in Table 1 below, showing how the four scenarios comprise a full spectrum of 
values for these variables.  
 
Table 1: Differences in Key Dimensions across the 4 Scenarios 
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Moreover, in terms of which vehicles will dominate Chinese city streets in 30 years’ time, 
these could yet be big or small, connected or not, ICE or plug-in (or self-propelled) and 
largely familiar to us in 2016 or completely unfamiliar (see Figures 1 and 2).   
 
For instance, while the ICE car falls at varying rates in three of the scenarios, in one it 
continues to grow, ultimately constrained, if not undone, only by insoluble gridlock.  Similarly, 
regarding the smaller vehicles (E2Ws and ‘disu’) at which Chinese low-carbon mobility 
innovation currently excels and is the global leader: in some scenarios these continue to 
grow in systemic significance and contribution to China’s economy, while in others they are 
proscribed and abandoned.   
 
Yet there are also significant similarities across all four, as one would indeed expect given 
the common evidence base from which they were all constructed.  In particular, all involve: 
– significant social and systemic change 
– the shaping and dominance of a ‘middle’ or ‘burgher’ class (ranging from 10% 
to 40% of population) 
– more or less digitization, albeit of vastly different kinds and trajectories; and  





Similarly, and of no less importance, is how none of them foresee the simple replacement of 
the ‘car’ by the ‘electric car’.  And it also seems a robust conclusion across all four that no 
future system in the medium-term will resolve all contemporary social and environmental 
challenges associated with contemporary mobility. 
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Together, then, this analysis elicits three major conclusions: 
 
“What is the preference of government?” 
This is obviously a key question, not only for a socio-technical transition demanding 
coordination of the scale of e-mobility, but also in any case in China, given continuing levers 
of government over the structure of the political economy and the automotive, ICTs and 
electricity sectors.  What these four scenarios illustrate, however, is how there is, at present, 
no simple answer to this question.   
 
Different tiers of government (from central to local), different ministries and different SOEs – 
and indeed other stakeholders, including (new) private businesses – are currently all 
competing to become dominant or pivotal players in future e-mobility systems.  There is thus 
no single dominant imaginary of the future currently guiding a unified national industrial 
policy.  E-mobility in China is thus at present an arena of considerable dynamism and it is 
possible, if not likely, that the players driving and most supported by government policy in 
what finally emerges as an e-mobility transition will be new and surprising players.  
 
Multiple different cities, overlapping scenarios 
Secondly, just as the four scenarios are not to be read as definitive futures, nor should they 
be seen as necessarily mutually incompatible. Indeed, distinct recognizable elements of all 
four could subsist together and feed into each other’s dynamics, even as there are clear 
limits to this compatibility.  This is a particularly important eventuality to consider once we 
again acknowledge the diversity of China’s cities and regions.   
 
For instance, a slow mobility system (≈S1) could take root in tourist locations (e.g. Sanya in 
Hainan or Hangzhou’s West Lake) and ‘hi-tech’ or university areas (e.g. Zhongguancun), but 
as quasi-elite and exceptional environments alongside a more generalized S2 system in the 
most developed megacities and a S3 system in (still very populous) 3rd, 4th and 5th tier cities 
and regions.  In such circumstances, the small pocket of S1 could be precisely what attracts 
‘global talent’ to China’s top cities and innovation zones, driving broader S2 adoption in 
these places (e.g. helping turn a few domestic manufacturers of small disu vehicles into (key 
divisions of) new e-mobility global giants); while this also draws policy attention from the rest 
of country, which is thereby abandoned to S3. 
 
We do not yet know what, or who, the ‘EV’ is 
Most importantly, though, the scenarios and the extent of qualitative and irreducible 
uncertainty they illustrate highlights perhaps the most important lesson for contemporary 
efforts – of business strategy and policy – at an expedited low-carbon mobility transition; 
namely that we do not yet know what the ‘electric vehicle’ is nor who it is, in terms of which 
industries, corporations and national/regional innovation systems will dominate it, and how it 
will be used, by which consumers, to service what demands in everyday life.   
 
This thus points to two key lessons: first, those engaged with e-mobility would do best to 
relinquish any ideas they have of the electric car as a familiar car-based system just 
powered by electricity rather than liquid fossil fuels; and, secondly, with so much of the 
socio-technical system still in flux but embryonic, the social futures of urban mobility, in all 
their qualitative complexity, are now there to be shaped, and with China as a key global site 





Our hope is that these scenarios help to stimulate a broader consideration of the profound 
social, economic and cultural changes that will accompany e-mobility innovation, whichever 
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The project ‘Low Carbon Innovation in China: Prospects, Politics and Practice’ is led 
from Lancaster University and is a collaboration between British and Chinese researchers to 
investigate different models of innovation and their potential role in low carbon transitions. 
The China Low Carbon Reports detail the project’s activities and findings in order to inform 
research and policy at national and international levels.  
 









The Centre for Mobilities Research (CeMoRe) at Lancaster University has been a globally-
leading centre for the new and fast-growing research field of mobilities since it was 
established in 2003. Mobilities encompasses the analysis of the global, national and local 
movements of people, objects, capital, information and material things combining together to 
engender the economic and social patterning of life.  
 
For more information about research and events, visit: 
www.lancaster.ac.uk/fass/centres/cemore/ 
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